Ransomware
Ransomware
Ransomware encrypts or steals data and demands payment for decryption keys or suppression of leaks.[5] Double- and triple-extortion models add data theft and DDoS threats to amplify pressure. Initial access via phishing, RDP brute-force or VPN exploits enables payload deployment. Immutable backups, recovery drills and network segmentation underpin resilient defences.
Ransomware: From Foothold to Double Extortion—and How to Stop It
Modern ransomware is fast, data‑centric, and professionalized. This article unpacks the operator playbook, how to detect activity early, and how to design containment and recovery that actually work under pressure.
Table of Contents
- What Sets Ransomware Apart
- Operator Playbook
- Initial Access and Privilege Escalation
- Data Theft, Encryption, Extortion
- High‑Signal Detections
- Containment and Recovery
- Prevention Priorities
- FAQ
- Related Topics
What Sets Ransomware Apart
Beyond encryption, operators exfiltrate sensitive data and threaten publication. Pressure comes from business interruption and reputational damage.
Operator Playbook
- Foothold: phishing, exposed RDP/VPN, vendor compromise
- Recon: domain enumeration, share crawling
- Privilege escalation and credential theft
- Data staging and exfiltration
- Encryption at scale, note deployment, negotiation
Initial Access and Privilege Escalation
Password spraying, token replay, edge‑service exploits, and identity misconfigurations dominate. See Access Control and Network Segmentation.
Data Theft, Encryption, Extortion
Operators target file servers, backup catalogs, and business systems; they disable recovery points and attempt to locate offline backups.
High‑Signal Detections
- Spikes in file renames/creates; unusual archivers
- Lateral movement via SMB + service control, PsExec, WMI/WinRM
- New admin accounts, sudden GPO pushes, mass script execution
- New domains with steady beacon jitter and JA3 shifts
Containment and Recovery
- Isolate segments; revoke tokens; disable compromised accounts
- Block exfil destinations; sinkhole C2 where possible
- Restore from immutable/offline backups; verify with canaries
- Forensics first to preserve ground truth
Prevention Priorities
- Phishing‑resistant MFA; identity tiering and JIT admin
- SMB signing; disable legacy protocols; allow‑listing
- Backups: offline, immutable, regularly tested
- Exercise IR: tabletop and live‑fire
FAQ
-
Should we pay?
It’s a business decision—never a security strategy—and doesn’t guarantee data return. -
Fastest spread stopper?
Segmentation and identity lockdown. -
Are backups enough?
Only if they’re offline/immutable and tested. -
Early detection?
Monitor mass file ops, new admin activity, unexpected lateral tools. -
Role of cyber insurance?
Align controls and evidence collection with policy requirements.
Related Topics
- Vulnerability and patch velocity
- Threat Intelligence